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Henze: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST LAW
SUMMARY

BHAN u. NME HOSPITALS, INC.: WHEN A NURSE
IS MORE THAN A NURSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bhan u. NME Hospitals, Inc., l the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court decision which held that, as a matter of
law, a nurse anesthesist did not compete in the same market as
an M.D. anesthesiologist. 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a nurse
anesthesist was a proper party to bring an antitrust action challenging defendant's new policy of allowing only M.D. anesthesiologists to work in Manteca Hospital. S The district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)4 was reversed and the case was remanded for
further proceedings. II
As a registered nurse anesthesist,6 plaintiff Vinod C. Bhan
1. 772 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Merrill, J.; the other panel members were
Goodwin, J. and Williams, D.J., Senior United States District Judge, Central District of
California, sitting by designation).
2. [d. at 1471.
3. [d.

4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a defensive motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's pleading because of its "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
5. 772 F.2d at 1471.
6. California Business and Professions Code, section 2826(a) defines a nurse anesthesist as "a person who is a registered nurse, licensed by the board and who has met
standards for certification from the board." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2826(a) (West
Supp. 1986). The "board" refers to the Division of Allied Health Professions of the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance of the State of California.
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had engaged in the bulk of his practice at Manteca Hospital
under the hospital's contract with Associated Anesthesia Services. But when that contract expired on March 31, 1983, the
hospital established a new policy allowing only M.D. anesthesiologists to practice in its operating rooms. 7 As a result, Bhan was
effectively prevented from practicing at Manteca Hospital and
most of his practice was destroyed. 8
Plaintiff sued under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman ActS
claiming that the new policy constituted a combination in restraint of trade. lo The district court granted defendant's motion
7. 772 F. 2d at 1468. The new policy was arrived at by the hospital board on the
recommendation of defendant Menaugh (the hospital administrator), and defendant
Yong Suk, M.D., as an inducement to Suk to relocate from Michigan to Manteca. Plaintiff Bhan alleged that the new policy was motivated by the fact that because nurse anesthesists' services are often more attractive to consumers due to their lower cost and their
more flexible scheduling, an exclusive contract would be necessary to make it financially
worthwhile for Suk to relocate. [d. at 1469.
8. [d. at 1469.
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1985).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act states: "Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
.... " Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (1985).
10. 765 F.2d at 1469. In Blue Shield of Virginia u. McCready, the Court stated that
the broad language of section 4, coupled with the lack of words of restriction, reflected
an intent by Congress to give the statute an expansive remedial purpose. This expansive
reading would effectively create a private enforcement mechanism, deter violators, and
provide ample compensation to victims. 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
In McCready, defendants entered into an arrangement whereby Blue Shield would
reimburse its subscribers for treatment by psychiatrists but not for the services of psychologists unless the treatment was supervised by and billed through a physician. [d. at
468. The Court stated:
Although McCready was not a competitor of the conspirators, the injury she suffered was inextricably intertwined with
the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists
and the psychology market .... [W)e think that McCready's
injury flows from that which makes the defendant's act unlawful . . . and falls squarely within the area of Congressional
concern.
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to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It
reasoned that even if the hospital's new policy constituted an
illegal combination in restraint of trade, the plaintiff was not a
proper party to bring the antitrust action against the defendants
because California law precluded nurse anesthesists from competing in the same market as M.D. anesthel3iologists.l1
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters,12 the United States Supreme
Court stated that because of the infinite variety of claims that
could arise, a universally applicable black-letter rule could not
be announced as to when an antitrust suit could be brought. 13
Instead, a case by case determination would be required, using a
variety of factors.14 The only one of these factors at issue in
Bhan was the requirement that the alleged injury be the type of
injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. lG This
requirement is twofold. First, there must be a sufficient physical
and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm
to plaintiff.18 Second, the plaintiff must participate in the same
relevant market as the defendants. 17
Id. at 483-84.
But the McCready Court also set limits on who may be a proper party to sue under
the antitrust laws. It found that not every party who has suffered an injury in fact is
entitled to recover. Certain injuries due to antitrust violations are too remote and there
is a point beyond which liability should not extend. Id. at 477.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court further narrowed and delineated this scope when it stated that the antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors." 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
11. 765 F.2d at 1469. The legislature defined the practice of nursing to include the
administration of medications and therapeutic agents but it also mandated that this
must be ordered by and administered under the direction of a physician. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2725(b) (West Supp. 1986).
12. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
13. Id. at 535-36.
14. Id. at 536-37. The factors identified by the Court included the nature of the
alleged injury, whether the plaintiff is a consumer or a competitor in the relevant market, the causal relationship between the alleged injury and the alleged restraint, the potential for duplicative recovery, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged
conspiracy. Id. at 537-45.
15. 772 F.2d at 1470.
16. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982).
17. Id. at 478. In considering the relevant market, the Bhan court focused on
whether there was a "reasonable interchangeability of use" or "cross-elasticity of demand" between the services offered by the plaintiff and those offered by the defendant.
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Using the test enunciated in Associated General Contractors, the Ninth Circuit found Bhan had demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the alleged violation and his economic
harm. The hospital's new policy had resulted in the loss of
eighty-percent of his practice. This loss was not fortuitous, remote, or incidental to the alleged violations, but flowed directly
from the new policy banning the use of nurse anesthesists in the
hospital. 18
The key factor thus became whether anesthesists and anesthesiologists competed in the same market. Ie The court noted
that the legislature had placed legal restrictions on nurse anesthesists which require any medications administered by a nurse
to be ordered by and given under the direction of a physician. 20
But rather than ending its inquiry here, as the district court had
done, the Ninth Circuit determined that a nurse anesthesist can
still perform many of the functions of an M.D. anesthesiologist. 21 Thus, the issue came down to whether the need for an
additional input, due to the supervision requirement, prevented
the two "products" from being interchangeable. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not, as a matter of law, and that
Bhan's allegations were sufficient to establish that he was a
proper party to bring the action. 211
To reach this conclusion, the court drew an analogy between
the instant case and the situations in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.28 and Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 1I4 In those cases the courts held that two
products could be considered part of the same relevant market,
even if one of the products required an additional input to make
it interchangeable with the other, as long as production could
I

772 F.2d at 1470-71. This is determined by practical factors such 88 industry or public
recognition of the submarket 88 a separate entity, unique customers, specialized vendors,
and distinct characteristics and use of the product. Where there is a high degree of "substitutability" in the use of two services, then the market for the two should be considered the same. See Twin City Sportserv v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 127274 (9th Cir. 1975).
18. 772 F.2d at 1469.
19. Id. at 1470.
20. 772 F.2d at 1471 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2725(b) (West Supp. 1986)).
21. 772 F.2d at 1471.
22.Id.
23. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
24. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
,
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easily be converted from one to the other.211 The court in Bhan
reasoned that because the physician required by statute to supervise an anesthesist can be any physician, not just an M.D.
anesthesiologist, and because such supervision is both common
and readily obtainable in the medical profession, there did exist
a reasonable interchangeability between the services of an anesthesist and those of an M.D. anesthesiologist. 26
III. CONCLUSION
In Bhan, the Ninth Circuit has further clarified which parties are proper to bring an antitrust action. In addition, as evidenced by the amicus briefs filed on behalf of the plaintiff by
the Attorney General of California, and by the Federal Trade
Commission,27 Bhan may become an important consumer protection decision if, upon remand, the district court finds for the
plaintiff. The case may serve both to promote the state's recognition of nursing as a dynamic growing profession and help contain a small part of the spiraling costs of medical care by providing consumers with a choice of anesthesia services.
Jeffrey L. Henze·

25. See Telex Corp., 510 F.2d 915-19; Calnetics Corp., 532 F.2d 691. In these cases,
the courts held that one manufacturer did have standing to sue another for antitrust
violations, even if the products the companies produced were not identical, as long as
one company's production facilities could easily have been turned to the production of
the other company's products. If this could readily be done, the degree of substitutability
would still be found to be high and the products would be considered part of the same
relevant market.
26. 772 F.2d at 1471.
27. Id. at 1468.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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